A Long History Indeed

A 'do-nothing' imperial power, by Dr. B. A. Hussainmiya

Pangs of conscience over the failure to protect Brunei under the 1888 Treaty hung over the British officialdom more closer at home, ie in Malaya than in the metropolis of London. There the policy makers exhibited injurious ignorance about the geography of the sultanate. This allowed Brooke to make a final dash to mop up the kingdom, first, bisecting Brunei by annexing Limbang. Second, obtaining land rights inside Brunei in Muara Damit, alarmingly named Brooketon and ostensibly to develop a colliery, around the mouth of the Brunei River. He also owned 3,500 acres of prime land in the Kota Batu, the seat of the ancient capital in Brunei. In the former he set up his own civil and legal administration.

Thus, John Anderson the British High Commissioner in Malaya who signed the 1906 Supplementary Treaty on behalf his Government (echoing McArthur's opinion) admitted that: "[Brunei]a country which has certainly not derived any benefit in the past from its position under British protection, and indeed , suffered, because of its position and its regard for British protection has rendered it easy for its neighbours to encroach on its territories with serious results to its resources and revenues."

Even before the introduction of the Residency system, the urgency remained, therefore, for people like McArthur, as a means of easing the imperial burden, 'to right the wrongs' done to Brunei. The first was the take over of the Brunei-owned Labuan Island by Britain using gunboat diplomacy in 1847. Second was their tacit approval for Charles Brooke's unilateral take over of the province of Limbang.

As regards the first, McArthur proposed to transfer the island from the bungling British North Borneo Company to be administered by the Crown and join it with Brunei. It was partially carried out in 1905 when the early Brunei Residents until 1921 had their seat of administration.
The problem of Limbang

Limbang issue emerged as the intractable problem. Several British officials at the time urged their Government to reinstate Limbang to Brunei. In January 1905, Sir Frank Swettenham, the outgoing High Commissioner in Malaya suggested that it would be "a great advantage to Brunei, if Limbang could be restored to Brunei, paying the Rajah of Sarawak whatever (if any thing) he can fairly claim." In fact, the Colonial Secretary directed the possibility of returning Limbang to Brunei that ought to be borne in mind during negotiations for the 1905-06 treaty.

McArthur's report made an indirect plea for the return of Limbang to Brunei, so that the kingdom could thrive again. For, the Limbang was the true river of Brunei described as 'the river of life' for the Bruneians in the Report. The so-called Brunei River, which had no ulu, was merely an arm of the sea, salt throughout its length. The large fertile Limbang had served the Kampong Ayer folk to foray food, find clothing and materials for housing and fishing. Since its annexation Brunei had lost vital revenue. Moreover, the petty traders, such as collectors of jungle produce, lost their means of livelihood. Above all, Bruneians felt bitterly about the loss of their 'soul' in Limbang dangling like the Democles' sword for years to come.

Although McArthur's wishful thinking bore no fruit because Brunei could not compensate the Rajah who fought a prestige battle. In the alternative there were other proposals to form a contagious territory for Brunei that would also satisfy Rajah's needs for undisturbed possession.
The Limbang boundary continued to be a bone of contention and a source of much friction given the fact that the district was never ceded by Brunei voluntarily. More importantly, for Brunei the contour of the country is such that the watershed of the Limbang comprised almost all the land between its banks and those of the Brunei. McArthur's solution was to make the Limbang River itself to form the boundary between (West) Brunei and Sarawak administration from its mouth up to the Mandalam confluence. By this arrangement, once for all the disputed ownership of land between Brunei and Limbang and the island of Berambang could be solved. Control of the upper Limbang would have given Brunei a means of communication between Belait and Tutong and Temburong. The Rajah did not agree to this either.

As regards Brooke's intention to own the remaining rump of Brunei by having toehold inside its heartland, McArthur checkmated him. Rajah's ownership of Muara Damit deprived the Sultan of all export and import revenues from goods passed through Muara. The goods that landed in Brooketon were distributed in the Brunei countryside without any taxes paid to the sultan's Government. Also buffaloes were exported from Brunei to Sarawak from this port without payment of duty of one dollar per head. Sir John Anderson noted that the position created by the British government's implied recognition of Rajah's revenue rights in Muara Damit was exteremly anamolous and difficult.

A more serious situation arose due to the gambling farm set up by Brooke in Muara. The Malays flocked there for gambling, many losers becoming debtors. Although McArthur's idea was not accepted immediately, Rajah Vyner Brooke had to abandon the venture in 1924. Otherwise, Muara could have become a haven gambling as Kuala Lurah has become haven for drinking! Not unexpectedly, Muara generated much crime and civil disputes arising from the immoral gambling activities. A population of only 6.6 per cent in the district accounted for 55.37 per cent of the civil cases and 16.14 per cent criminal case in 1912.

McArthur resisted a proposal strongly to hand over Temburong to Sarawak in return for its surrendering the rights in Muara. Temburong contained no Tulin property except the Labu, and the incoming administration could manage it without any encumbrances owing to complicated and bogus land rights.

Similarly, if another suggestion of the British Colonial Office went through at the time, Belait and Tutong would have been exchanged for Limbang with Sarawak in order for Brunei to keep its territories as one piece. Had it happened, needless to say, Brunei would be today sitting over some sparsely populated green hectares of Limbang instead of reaping the rich benefits of the black gold!

Apparently in so far as introducing the Residency system to Brunei was concerned the British authorities applied firmness. Not so when it came to Brooke's dealings with the Sultanate. The British government conveniently had adopted a 'do nothing' and 'let it develop' attitude. In fact, then as later in the 1950s, the same do nothing attitude by London's White hall contributed to much fiasco during the drafting of the Brunei Constitution.

Brunei needed more than the restructuring of its institutions ala West. True, that the British intervention saved Brunei from extinction. Yet, a sincere commitment on the part of the British government in recovering Brunei's lost lands owing to treachery and wheeler-dealings by one of its own agents would have added much value to the country. Some key British officials believed, perhaps rightly, that the Sarawak Rajah had not abandoned the ambition to own Brunei even by resorting to strong arm tactics. But McArthur was not one of them- he sealed the Rajah's fate as far as Brunei was concerned, although Brunei was unlucky to get back at that opportune moment its soil rights in Limbang and Labuan.